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Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the eﬀects of a costly pun-
ishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long ﬁnitely re-
peated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring envi-
ronment increasing the severity of the potential punishment monoton-
ically increases both contributions and the average net payoﬀs of sub-
jects. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we ﬁnd a
U-shaped relationship between the severity of punishment and average
net payoﬀs. Access to a standard punishment technology in this set-
ting signiﬁcantly decreases net payoﬀs, even in the long run. Access to
a very severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoﬀs
as with no punishment option, as the beneﬁts of increased cooperation
oﬀset the social costs of punishing.
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A large and growing experimental literature in economics, starting with Fehr
and G¨ achter (2000), demonstrates that the possibility of costly punishment
facilitates increased cooperation in ﬁnite-horizon social dilemma situations
such as prisoner’s dilemma and public good contribution games.1 A recent
paper by G¨ achter et al. (2008) shows that if the game horizon is long
enough, the possibility of punishment also increases average net payoﬀs in
the population.2 That is, while in early periods of the game (roughly the
ﬁrst ten periods in the 50-period game investigated) the welfare-improving
eﬀect of increased cooperation is more than counter-balanced by the welfare-
reducing eﬀect of relatively frequent use of the punishment option, in the
rest of the game a high level of cooperation is maintained with little explicit
use of the punishment option. This result is consistent with group selection
models of cooperation and punishment.3
In this paper we investigate how the option of costly punishment aﬀects
welfare in a more realistic environment, in which subjects observe each oth-
ers’ decisions with a small amount of noise. In particular, we investigate
a public good contribution game in which after each contribution decision
the public record of a player, that is the information on the subject’s con-
tribution announced publicly to all players, might diﬀer from the true con-
tribution of the subject: even if the subject contributed to the public good,
with 10% probability the public record indicates no contribution. This de-
sign corresponds to partnership situations in which even if a member of the
partnership contributes to a joint project, the others do not recognize the
1For the original references in social sciences, see Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al.
(1992), and the theoretical contribution of Boyd and Richerson (1992). For empirical
evidence for the relevance of costly punishment outside the lab, see Krueger and Mas
(2004) and Mas (2008).
2An earlier string of papers (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2002; Gurerk et al., 2006; Herrmann
et al., 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008; and Dreber et al., 2008) shows that in repeated
games with a shorter time horizon, the social costs of punishment tend to outweigh the
beneﬁts coming from increased cooperation. Rand et al. (2009) investigates the eﬀect of
access to punishment versus reward options in long (50-period) contribution games. For
a theoretical investigation of the potential social costs and beneﬁts of punishment, see
Hwang and Bowles (2010).
3See Boyd et al. (2003), and Chapter 13 in Bowles (2003).
2contribution, at least not until some later time. In our design such mis-
takes in the public record only inﬂuence the subjects’ information, not their
payoﬀs, which are determined by their true actions.4
Our design is in most parts similar to that of G¨ achter et al. (2008).
In particular, we examine 50-period public good contribution games, and
we adopt the same mapping between contributions and payoﬀs.5 The only
diﬀerent aspect is that in our experiments subjects can only choose between
contributing all or none of their endowments in each round. This was imple-
mented in order to simplify the noise structure, with the intent that subjects
understand better how their public records depend probabilistically on their
decisions. Because of this change, we also ran a control design in which
subjects observed each others’ contributions perfectly. The other dimension
in which we varied the design was the amount and eﬀectiveness of costly
punishment subjects could inﬂict on each other: we employed (i) a no pun-
ishment environment; (ii) a standard punishment technology that is used in
G¨ achter et al. (2008), among other experimental papers, in which a subject
can inﬂict a damage of 3 tokens for every token spent on punishment, and
there is an upper limit on the amount of damage that could be inﬂicted;
and (iii) a strong punishment technology, in which a subject can inﬂict a
damage of 6 tokens for every token spent on punishment, and there was no
upper limit on the amount of punishment. Hence, our experiments facil-
itated investigating the eﬀects of increasing the severity of punishment in
both perfect and imperfect monitoring environments.
We found that in the benchmark perfect monitoring condition increas-
ing the severity of punishment increased both the amount of contributions
and the average net payments (that is payments net the costs implied by
4The realized payoﬀs were revealed to subjects at the end of the experiment.
5A se x p r e s s e di nG ¨ achter et al., there is an assertion in the experimental literature
that play in long ﬁnitely repeated games, aside the last few periods, is similar to play in
indeﬁnitely repeated games with a large continuation probability. We are not aware of
a formal test of this claim. Our results are relevant for inﬁnite-horizon situations to the
extent that the above assertion is adopted. In the real world there are both situations
which are well approximated by an ﬁnite-horizon model (if there is a highlighted point of
time after which the probability of continued interaction is very small), and ones which
are better approximated by an inﬁnite-horizon model.
3imposed and received punishments) monotonically. This reinforces the ﬁnd-
ings of Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), the ﬁrst paper in the literature
that investigated the eﬀects of varying the severity of punishment.6 In the
presence of either of the punishment options subjects learned to cooperate.
In the strong punishment design this learning quickly led to almost full co-
operation in the public good game, and virtually no use of the punishment
option after a few initial periods.
In the imperfect monitoring environment the observed patterns are very
diﬀerent. The possibility of using the standard punishment option, while
increasing contributions by a modest amount, signiﬁcantly decreased average
net earnings. Contribution levels stayed far away from full cooperation,
and subjects kept on using the punishment option regularly throughout the
whole game. In fact, average per period net earnings stabilized for the second
half of the experiment, suggesting that the same qualitative conclusions
would hold in even longer time horizons.
In contrast to standard punishment, the strong punishment option does
increase average contributions signiﬁcantly, even in the imperfect monitoring
environment. However, the use of the punishment technology remains rel-
atively frequent throughout the game. In our experiment these contrasting
eﬀects on the payoﬀs cancel each other out, and average net earnings with
the strong punishment option are about the same as with no punishment
option.
To summarize, in a noisy environment, it is not clear whether the costly
punishment option is beneﬁcial for society, even in the long run. Moreover,
we ﬁnd a U-shaped relationship between the severity of possible punish-
ment and social welfare: the possibility of an intermediate level of punish-
ment signiﬁcantly decreases social welfare relative to when no punishment
is available, while the possibility of severe punishment results in payoﬀs has
a roughly zero net beneﬁt for society.
A closer look at the data provides hints for why costly punishment is less
eﬀective in a noisy environment in establishing cooperation. First, subjects
6Nikiforakis and Normann investigated punishment eﬀectiveness ratios 1:1, 1:2, 1:3,
and 1:4 in 10-times repeated public good contribution games with perfect monitoring.
4who were punished ”unfairly”, in the sense that the punishment followed a
contribution by the subject, were less likely to contribute in the next round.7
Such unfair punishment happens more often in the imperfect monitoring en-
vironment, following a wrong public record. The above eﬀect gets curtailed
in the design with strong punishment, but at the cost that when punishment
occurs (and it does occur from time to time) then it inﬂicts heavy damage.
Second, in the case of regular punishment, the positive eﬀect of punishing
non-contributors on their subsequent contributions is reduced. This suggests
either that non-contributors do not believe that others will keep on punish-
ing them for public records of not contributing in a noisy environment, or
that they keep on not contributing because of the possibility that they get
a wrong public record and get punished anyway even if they contribute.
Our paper complements ﬁndings in a number of recent papers. Bereby-
Meyer and Roth (2006) show that players’ ability to learn to cooperate in
a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is substantially diminished when pay-
oﬀs are noisy, even though in their experiment players could monitor each
other’s past actions perfectly.8 In contrast, we ﬁnd that a small noise in
monitoring, albeit decreasing contributions in all conditions, does so sig-
niﬁcantly only in the strong punishment treatment. Abbink and Sadrieh
(2009) ﬁnd that if contributions are observed perfectly but there is noise in
observing punishment then subjects punish each other more, reducing over-
all eﬃciency. Bornstein and Weisel (2010) and Patel et al. (2010), using
diﬀerent designs, show that the beneﬁts of costly punishment are diminished
when there is uncertainty regarding the realized endowment of subjects (but
contributions are perfectly observed). Most closely related to our investi-
gation is Grechenig et al. (2010), who in a work independent from ours
also point out that in a noisy environment punishment can reduce welfare.
7This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) in that punish-
ment facilitates future cooperation, but only when it evokes shame and guilt, not when
it evokes anger. The paper uses information on players’ emotions captured through a
questionnaire during the experiment. Herrmann et al. (2008) also ﬁnd that (antisocial)
punishment of contributors lowers their subsequent contributions.
8See also Gong et al. (2009) on repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with stochastic
payments, in a group versus individual decision-making context.
5They do not investigate the eﬀects of increasing the severity of punishment
technology, which is the main focus of our paper, and instead examine the
eﬀects of varying the level of noise in observations. Furthermore, like all the
above papers, Grechenig et al. focus on relatively short repeated games, in
which the welfare beneﬁts of costly punishment are ambiguous even without
noise (see footnote 2).
We also contribute to the small but growing experimental literature on
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring (Miller, 1996; Aoyagi and
Fr´ echette, 2009; Fudenberg et al., 2010) although these papers investigate
issues largely unrelated to ours.9
II Experimental Design
We implemented six treatments in a 3x2 factorial design. In the punishment
dimension we varied between no, regular and strong punishment options,
and in the noise dimension we employed either no noise in the information
about other group members’ contributions, or small noise. In our baseline
experimental design, the instructions and procedures follow closely those
of G¨ achter et al. (2008). Namely, experimental subjects participated in
a 50-rounds repeated public good game. At the beginning, participants
were randomly and anonymously matched to groups of three which stayed
constant over all 50 rounds. In each round, each of the three participants
in a group was endowed with 20 tokens and asked to either contribute all
or none of these tokens to a group account.10 If the amount was kept it
beneﬁtted the participant by 20 points, while if the amount was contributed
it beneﬁtted each of the three group members by 0.5 × 20 = 10 points.
After all group members made their choice simultaneously, they were
informed about the outcome of the game. In the no noise conditions par-
ticipants were informed about the choices in their group, while in the noise
9Earlier experimental papers that investigate manipulating players’ information in re-
peated games in less standard ways (such as presenting information with delay, or in a
cognitively more complex manner) include Kahn and Murnighan (1993), Cason and Khan
(1999), Sainty (1999) and Bolton et al. (2005).
10This binary choice diﬀers from G¨ achter et al. (2008), as we aimed to implement a
simple noise structure.
6treatments only a “public record” of each group member’s choice was dis-
played. If a group member did not contribute, then the public record would
always indicate “no contribution”. If the group member contributed, there
was a 10% chance that the public record showed “no contribution” rather
than “contribution”. Participants were fully informed about the structure
of the noise.
In the no punishment conditions the round ended after that information
was displayed, and the experiment continued with the next round. In the
punishment conditions subjects participated in a second stage in each round.
Here they were asked whether they would like to assign up to 5 deduction
points to the other two members of their group.11 Assigning deduction
points did incur a cost to the punisher of one point per deduction point. In
the regular punishment treatments each assigned deduction point implied a
reduction of 3 points of the punished group member’s income. However, the
eﬀect of received punishment was capped at the earnings from the public
goods game, while a punisher always had to pay for assigned punishment
points. Thus, participants could incur losses in a round only in the size of
their own punishment to others. This punishment technology mimics the
one used in G¨ achter et al. (2008) and many other public good experiments in
the literature. In the strong punishment treatments, each assigned reduction
point reduced the income of the punished group member by 6 points, and
that income reduction was not capped, such that negative round incomes
were allowed.12
The experimental sessions took place in February and March 2010 and
2011 at the ASB Experimental Research Laboratory at the University of
New South Wales. Experimental subjects were recruited from the university
student population using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner
2004). Overall, 339 subjects participated in 12 sessions, between 24 and 30
per session. Upon arrival participants were seated in front of a computer
11Public records of the other two group members were always displayed anonymously
in random ordering. Punishment choices were elicited on that same ordering, such that
punishment could be dedicated, but reputation eﬀects across rounds were excluded.
12However, the overall experiment income was capped at zero such that participants
would go home with no less than their show-up fee of AU$ 5.
7at desks which are separated by dividers. Participants received written
instructions and could ask questions which were answered privately.The ex-
periment started after participants completed a short comprehension test
at the screen. The experiment was computerized and programmed in zTree
(Fischbacher 2007). At the end of the experiment, participants ﬁlled in a
short survey asking for demographics. They were then privately paid out
their cumulated experiment earnings in cash (with a conversion rate of AU$
0.02 per point) plus a AU$ 5 show-up fee and left the laboratory. Average
earnings were AU$ 28.94, with a standard deviation of AU$ 5.31.
III Results
III.A Aggregate results
As groups stay constant over all 50 rounds, each group in our experiment
constitutes one statistically independent observation. To test for treatment
diﬀerences non-parametrically we apply 2-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests,
using group averages as independent observations.
Table 1 lists the average contributions, punishments and net proﬁts ob-
served in our six treatments. Figures 1 and 2 display the evolution of public
good contributions and net proﬁts over time.
TABLE 1: Average contributions, punishment and net profits in
treatments
N Avg. Avg. Avg.
participants contribution punishment net proﬁts
No noise
No Punishment 57 5.59 22.80
Regular Punishment 57 12.40 0.64 23.66
Strong Punishment 54 17.61 0.48 25.45
Noise
No Punishment 57 4.04 22.02
Regular Punishment 60 9.60 1.45 19.10
Strong Punishment 54 16.04 0.65 23.48
8As Table 1 reveals, noise leads to lower contributions in all three pun-
ishment conditions. This is, however, only statistically signiﬁcant for strong
punishment (p =0 .011) and not signiﬁcant for no and regular punishment
(p =0 .511 and p =0 .144, respectively).
The eﬀects of punishment on contributions are more signiﬁcant. Contri-
butions increase monotonically from no punishment over regular punishment
to strong punishment both under no noise (p-values of 0.005, 0.030, and 0.001
for regular punishment vs. no punishment, strong punishment vs. regular
punishment, and strong punishment vs. no punishment, respectively) and
noise (p-values of 0.004, 0.001, and 0.001, respectively).
With respect to the average number of assigned punishment points, Ta-
ble 1 seems to suggest that there are less punishment points assigned when
their eﬀect is more severe.13 This, however, is only signiﬁcant in the noise
treatments (p =0 .001), while statistically no such eﬀect can be established
when there is no noise (p =0 .385). On the other hand, both regular and
strong punishment are more likely when there is noise than if there is no
noise (p =0 .001 and p =0 .068, respectively).
Finally, while noise does not have a measurable eﬀect on proﬁts when
there is no punishment option available (p =0 .511), it (weakly) signiﬁcantly
decreases net proﬁts (net of employed and received punishment) when pun-
ishment is available (p =0 .024 and p =0 .069 for regular and strong pun-
ishment, respectively). Along the punishment dimension, when there is no
noise,o n l ystrong punishment has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on payoﬀs
compared to the baseline with no punishment (p =0 .035), while the dif-
ferences of regular punishment to both others are insigniﬁcant (p =0 .737
and p =0 .352 when compared to no punishment and strong punishment,
respectively). If there is noise then the picture looks diﬀerent: the regular
punishment condition yields lower net proﬁts than both the baseline and
the strong punishment condition, though this eﬀect is only signiﬁcant for
the latter (p =0 .319 and p =0 .033, respectively). The robustness of these
13This observation is closely related to the endogenously lower number of non-
contributions. For a breakdown of punishment by reason see Table 3 and the discussion
in Section III.B below.
9results is conﬁrmed by further tests applied to data from only the last 30 or
last 20 rounds.






































10Figures 1 and 2 suggest that after some initial volatility, contributions
and net proﬁts in the diﬀerent treatments tend to stabilize over time, aside
from relatively small endgame eﬀects in the very last periods (analogously
to G¨ achter et al. 2008). This observation is corroborated by a battery of
two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test comparing the average
contributions and net proﬁts in rounds 11 to 30 to rounds 31 to 50, which all
yield p-values larger than 0.132, with the following exceptions: contributions
increase over time with no noise and strong punishment (p =0 .052) and
decrease with noise when there is no punishment or it is weak (p =0 .016
and p =0 .011, respectively), and net proﬁts in the no-punishment-noise
treatment were lower in later rounds (p =0 .010).
To complement the non-parametric analysis we ran Probit and ordi-
nary least-square regressions controlling for interaction eﬀects between our
treatments. In particular, we regressed contributions, punishments and net
earnings on the treatment dummies Regular Punishment and Strong Pun-
ishment, dummy Noise (being 1 in all noise treatments), and interaction
eﬀects of Noise with the two punishment dummies. All regressions also con-
trol for trends over time. As the groups of three participants are our units
of statistically independent observations, we cluster standard errors on that
level.
Table 2 lists the results from this analysis. We ﬁnd a strong positive
eﬀect of punishment on contributions to the public good, which is even
almost doubled if punishment is more severe. Noise, on the other hand, has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on how much participants contribute. The number of
assigned punishment points is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected when punishment
is more severe, but noise increases this number signiﬁcantly, though less so
when is punishment is strong. With respect to net earnings, punishment
has a signiﬁcant general positive eﬀect only when it is strong. When noise
is existent in addition to punishment, net payoﬀs are signiﬁcantly reduced,
but only under the regular punishment technology.14 This leads to a U-
shape of net earnings along the severity of punishment dimension under
14Hypothesis F-tests conﬁrm at the 5%-level that the joint eﬀect of Weak Punishment
and NoisexWeak Punishment is negative, but cannot reject that the joint eﬀect of Strong
Punishment and NoisexStrong Punishment is diﬀerent from zero (p=0.133).
11TABLE 2: Probit/OLS estimations of contributions,
punishments and net earnings based on treatment dummies
Model Probit OLS OLS




Period -0.001 -0.01** 0.05***
[0.001] [0.00] [0.02]
Regular Punishment 0.332*** 0.86
[0.096] [1.36]
Strong Punishment 0.576*** -0.16 2.65**
[0.072] [0.23] [1.33]
Noise -0.099 0.81*** -0.78
[0.101] [0.28] [0.80]
Noise x Regular Punishment -0.041 -3.77*
[0.150] [2.01]
Noise x Strong Punishment -0.030 -0.64* -1.19
[0.169] [0.34] [1.65]
N 16950 11250 16950
Pseudo R-squared 0.195
Adjusted R-squared 0.047 0.053
Note: For the Probit estimation on contributions, we report marginal eﬀects rather than
coeﬃcients. For all estimations, robust standard errors are clustered at group level and given
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, respectively.
noise: regular punishment has a negative eﬀect on net earnings, but with
strong punishment this negative eﬀect is mitigated by the additional positive
earnings eﬀect in that condition.
III.B Punishment pattern
Table 3 displays the average number of received punishment points con-
ditional on the published contribution of a subject. Obviously, punish-
ment received following a public record of no contribution is considerably
12TABLE 3: Average punishment points spent, conditional on
receiver’s contribution and public record
All rounds Only ﬁrst round
Punish- Strong Punish- Strong
ment Pnmt ment Pnmt
No noise
After contribution decision was
Contribution 0.212 0.316 0.114 0.771
Defect 1.338 1.681 1.636 3.000
Noise
After public record was
Contribution 0.411 0.262 0.742 0.583
Defect 2.236 1.666 1.414 1.444
Note: Punishment points are not multiplied with factor 3 or 6, yet.
higher than otherwise.15 However, even for cooperators punishment levels
are greater than zero. This might root in anti-social punishment (defec-
tors punishing contributors, see also Herrmann et al., 2008), or could be an
eﬀect of some subjects also punishing for older oﬀenses. With regular pun-
ishment we observe higher punishment levels under noise (but signiﬁcantly
so only for punishment towards contributors, p =0 .030), while punishment
levels are unaﬀected by noise or even slightly less when punishment is strong
(p =0 .331 and p =0 .033 for punishment after contribution and defection
records, respectively).
Comparing regular to strong punishment we observe that punishment
towards contributors is not aﬀected by the punishment technology, neither
with nor without noise, and neither in terms of assigned or (multiplied) re-
ceived punishment points (all p-values larger than 0.266). With respect to
defectors, however, the number of received (multiplied) punishment points,
the eventually resulting income reduction, is larger if punishment is more
severe, both without and with noise (p =0 .001 and p =0 .027, respectively),
while the number of assigned points is only diﬀerent if there is no noise
15This is strongly signiﬁcant in all four punishment treatments, with all p-values smaller
than 0.006. These and the following tests are based on the corresponding averages on the
independent group level.
13(p =0 .015, vs. p =0 .827 with noise). As a result, a stronger punishment
technology leads to a larger discrimination between contributors and defec-
tors: while the former attract (not signiﬁcantly) less punishment points, the
latter are punished even harsher.
All these described eﬀects are already existent when only looking at the
very ﬁrst round of the game (see the right part of Table 3), and statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly so except for the diﬀerences between regular and strong
punishment. Since in the ﬁrst round subjects cannot punish for older of-
fenses, this provides clearer evidence that a public record of not contributing
in a given round attracts more punishment points in the same round than
a public record of contributing. Contributors do receive some punishment
even in the ﬁrst round though, indicating the existence of purely antisocial
punishment.
We employ Probit regression analysis to analyze reactions to received
punishment and other previous experiences. In Model 1 of Table 4, we esti-
mate the current round’s contribution of a participant based on the number
of punishment points she received in the last round (RecPnmtLR, not yet
multiplied with the punishment factor). We control for the last round’s con-
tribution of this participant (ContrLR), and interact with treatment dum-
mies on whether noise was present (Noise), whether the strong punishment
technology was present (StrPnmt), or both (Noise x StrPnmt).
Due to the binary nature of contribution decisions, contributors can
only ﬁx or reduce their contribution, while non-contributors’ contributions
can only stay the same or increase. The large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
ContrLR dummy indicates the general diﬀerences in trends between partic-
ipants who contributed before or not. Our main interest, however, lies in
the interactions. We ﬁnd that for non-contributors, the higher the received
punishment, the more likely they are to contribute in the next round. This
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly increased when the punishment has a stronger impact.
When, on the other hand, contributors get punished, then they are likely to
decrease their contribution in the next round, and more so the higher the
punishment. The punishment technology eﬀect discussed above now works
in the other direction, softening this discouraging eﬀect when punishment is
strong. In both cases, noise does not seem to play a role.
14TABLE 4: Probit estimations of current contribution based on
last round behavior
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
RecPnmtLR 0.041*** 0.022** 0.012
[0.011] [0.011] [0.008]
RecPnmtLR x Noise -0.009 0.004
[0.013] [0.010]
RecPnmtLR x StrPnmt 0.039** 0.0571*** 0.023**
[0.016] [0.018] [0.012]
RecPnmtLR x Noise x StrPnmt 0.012 -0.003
[0.023] [0.015]
ContrLR 0.794*** 0.705*** 0.535***
[0.025] [0.037] [0.046]
ContrLR x RecPnmtLR -0.144*** -0.124*** -0.073***
[0.040] [0.023] [0.024]
ContrLR x RecPnmtLR x Noise 0.046 0.024
[0.041] [0.026]
ContrLR x RecPnmtLR x StrPnmt 0.076* 0.025 0.051*
[0.043] [0.026] [0.027]
ContrLR x RecPnmtLR x Noise x StrPnmt -0.070 -0.031
[0.046] [0.030]
ContrLR x PRwrong LR 0.016
[0.057]
ContrLR x PRwrong LR x RecPnmtLR 0.085***
[0.021]




ContrLR x OtherContrLR 0.121*
[0.065]
N 11025 5586 11025
Pseudo R-squared 0.454 0.353 0.535
Note: We report marginal eﬀects rather than coeﬃcients. Robust standard errors, clustered
at group level, are given in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1%-level, respectively. ContrLR and RecPnmtLR refer to contribution and punishment
received in the last round, respectively, while PRwrong LR indicates whether the public
record of a contributor in the last round was wrong, and OtherContrLR represents the
average contribution (scaled [0,1]) of the other two group members in the last round. Noise
and StrPnmt are dummies indicating whether noise or the strong punishment technology
were present.
15The Probit Model 2 reported in Table 4 concentrates on choices under
Noise, and explores whether having been a contributor with a wrong public
record in the last round (PRwrongLR) has an eﬀect on how that participants
reacts to being punished by her group members. While in the new model any
other eﬀects are robust, the lack of signiﬁcance for ContrLRxPRwrongLR
suggests that having had a wrong public record does not inﬂuence contri-
butions by itself, the signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the interaction term with
the received punishment indicates that those contributors are less likely to
reduce their contribution when being punished, and similar so in both pun-
ishment regimes. Nevertheless, the net eﬀect of increasing the punishment
of a subject with a wrong public record on the next period contribution of
this subject is still negative.
Finally, Model 3 includes the average contribution of the other two group
members (OtherContrLR, scaled to [0,1]) as a control into the estimation
equation of Model 1. We ﬁnd that current contributions are indeed highly
correlated with the other group members’ last contributions (more for pre-
vious contributors). This might be interpreted as an alternative type of
punishment by reducing future payoﬀs (though such punishment cannot be
targeted towards an individual), or as evidence for coordination on and con-
vergence to a group norm. The inclusion of these controls reduces the pos-
itive eﬀect of punishment on subsequent contributions of non-contributors,
but the eﬀect remains signiﬁcantly positive in the strong punishment treat-
ment. The negative eﬀects of punishment on contributors subsequent choice
are robust against including the controls. These results, however, have to be
interpreted with care due to multicollinearity, as the relation between own
and others’ contributions in the last round (ContrLR and OtherContrLR)i s
highly correlated with the subsequently received punishment (RecPnmtLR).
III.C Evolution of cooperation and punishment in groups
In Figures 3 and 4 we classify the groups in the diﬀerent treatments by
whether there was full, partial, or no contribution to the public good in
diﬀerent periods, and study the emergence of such groups over time. Figure 4
16additionally includes the pattern of punishment over time for groups which
started and ended with full public good contributions, groups which started
low but converged to full contributions after some time, and groups which
did not manage to reach full contributions.
FIGURE 3: No punishment treatments - Group cooperation
over time






































Figure 3 shows that when there is no punishment available, groups who
started out with at least some contributions become no-contribution groups
over time. As we observe on the left side of Figure 4, under regular punish-
ment and if there is no noise, most groups polarize such that either all or none
of the group members contribute. When we add noise to the information
about others’ contributions, we observe higher dispersion of contributions
within groups, such that there is no convergence to polarized groups, but
some consistent increase in the number of no-cooperation groups. Under
a severe punishment regime, groups quickly converge to homogenous full-
contribution groups. This general tendency stays intact with noise in the
public information.
17FIGURE 4: Punishment treatments - Group cooperation over









































































































































































18We statistically conﬁrm these observations with a battery of Fisher Ex-
act tests comparing the shares of diﬀerent groups in the very ﬁrst and the
very last round of a treatment. We ﬁnd that when there is no punishment
available, then the share of groups who at least partly contribute shrinks and
the share of groups with no contributions at all increases over time, both
with and without noise (all p-values smaller than 0.01). On the contrary,
under the strong punishment regime, the share of partly contributing groups
decreases, too, but is accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in full contribu-
tion groups (all p-values smaller than 0.05), again no matter whether noise is
existent or not. With regular punishment, however, we observe a signiﬁcant
decrease in the share of partly contributing groups when there is no noise
(p =0 .045), and we ﬁnd a weakly signiﬁcant increase in the share of groups
who do not contribute at all when there is noise (p =0 .082), in both cases
with no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the individual shares of other two group types.
When comparing statistically between noise and no noise treatments, we
do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the ﬁrst round of all punishment
regimes (all p-values larger than 0.25), and diﬀerences for the last round only
for regular punishment: the share of groups with full contributions in the
last round is signiﬁcantly lower (p =0 .003) when there is noise than when
there is no noise. When comparing between the punishment conditions, we
ﬁnd that treatments do not start out with diﬀerent distributions of group
types, except that under strong punishment there are less no-contribution
groups in the ﬁrst round than without punishment options (p =0 .020 and
p =0 .008 for no noise and noise, respectively). For the last round, how-
ever, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the distribution of group types across
punishment conditions. When there is no noise, then we have a monotone
increase of the last-round share of full-contribution groups and a monotone
decrease of the share of no-contribution going from no punishment to regular
punishment and strong punishment (all p-values smaller than 0.01). Com-
paring the end of the treatments with noise, this pattern only holds true
for strong punishment (all p-values smaller than 0.05), while regular pun-
ishment now features more partial-contribution groups (p =0 .014) rather
than full-contribution groups (p =1 .000), compared to no punishment.
19The right side of Figure 4 displays average punishment in diﬀerent classes
of groups. If there is no noise, then groups which start with full contributions
and end with full contributions experience no punishment at all during the
game. While we do not observe such groups under noise and regular pun-
ishment, we observe some but low punishment in such groups under noise
and a strong punishment regime (potentially indicating successful but costly
coordination on cooperation).
IV Conclusion
This paper ﬁnds that while in a perfect monitoring public good contribution
environment increasing the severity of a costly punishment option unambigu-
ously increases average net payoﬀs, in an imperfect monitoring environment
the above relationship is nonmonotonic. Moreover, at least for some punish-
ment technologies, the presence of costly punishment can be detrimental for
society. This weakens the case that group selection evolutionary procedures
lead to emotional responses like anger and revenge, inducing individuals to
punish cheaters.
A possible direction for future research is reexamining the questions ad-
dressed in this paper using data from real world environments in which
dissatisﬁed participants can punish each other, such as feedback scores in
electronic commerce, or grades and teacher evaluations in higher education.
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